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Eternity, Boredom, and One’s Part-Whole-Reality Conception
Abstract: Bernard Williams famously argued that eternal life is undesirable for a human because it would inevitably grow intolerably boring.  I will argue against Williams and those who share his view.  To make my case, I will provide an account of what staves off boredom in our current, earthly-mortal lives, and then I will draw on this account while advancing reasons for thinking that eternal life is desirable, given certain conditions.  Though my response to Williams will partly overlap with some prior responses to Williams, especially the one offered by J. M. Fischer, my response will also be distinctive in some important ways.  For instance, it will be distinctive in that it will discuss the role that one’s part-whole-reality conception plays in fending off boredom, where by ‘one’s part-whole-reality conception’ I mean ‘one’s conception of his or her place (or purpose) in the whole of reality’.


Bernard Williams famously argued that, although it may well be desirable to live for a great many years, it would be intolerable to live forever.​[1]​  In describing the nature of the intolerability that he intends here, Williams implicitly or explicitly refers to a number of distinct but commonly clustered phenomena: chronic boredom or tediousness, joylessness or anhedonia, colorlessness, indifference, meaninglessness, and a sense of a lack of purpose or reason to continue on with life.  In what follows I will frequently use ‘boredom’ as a summary term for this whole cluster of phenomena.  (One cautionary point here, though: I think that ‘boredom/depression’ might be a more appropriate summary term to use, since it might do a better job of indicating that Williams here has in mind not only chronic boredom but, indeed, a whole cluster of phenomena.​[2]​  For brevity, I will stick with ‘boredom’ as my summary term.  But, as readers proceed through this paper, I would like for them to keep in mind the cautionary point just noted.)  
Williams is thinking that, if you were to live for, say, thousands of years, then, at some point along the way, you would surely fall into a state of intolerable boredom, if only because there would be nothing new for you to do or experience.  Granted, we can imagine you undergoing certain radical psychological changes that might effectively eliminate this problem of intolerable boredom.  For instance, given the assumption that the continuity of your memories is not required for the continuity of you, we can imagine you losing all of your memories at once and yet still remaining yourself, in which case your activities and experiences could indeed be new again for you.  For the purposes of this paper, however, I will leave aside all discussion of radical psychological changes, as I want to focus on the following question: Is it desirable for a human being to live forever, assuming that he or she will always retain his or her memories in some good measure, and also assuming that he or she will always retain his or her fairly determinate character or personality?  Focusing on this question seems appropriate, for it is really this question that we (in the contemporary West, anyway) typically have in mind when we ask whether eternal life is desirable for a human.​[3]​  Throughout this paper, I will, for convenience, use ‘a human’ to mean ‘a human who retains memory-and-character constancy in some good measure’.  And, against Williams and those who share his view, I will argue that eternal life is desirable for a human, given certain conditions. 
Aside from this introductory section, there will be four sections to this paper.  In section I, I will provide a more detailed statement than I have so far of the argument made by Williams and others for the claim that eternal life would inevitably grow intolerably boring.  In section II, I will consider some of the extant responses to this argument from Williams and those who share his view.  What I say in section II will set the stage for section III.  There I will provide an account of what staves off boredom in our current, earthly-mortal lives, and then I will draw on this account while advancing reasons for thinking that eternal life is desirable, given certain conditions.  In section IV, I will briefly conclude the paper.
One point of clarification concerning the setting for eternal life: Discussions of eternal life might focus either on the possibility of living of an eternal afterlife (e.g., in the Christian heaven or in the house of Hades that Socrates speaks of near the end of the Apology) or on the possibility of extending humans’ earthly lives such that they literally go on forever (e.g., Williams considers the possibility of a human’s living forever here on earth by taking an extraordinary elixir that allow for this).  In what follows I will take into account both the eternal-afterlife possibility and the extending-earthly-life-forever possibility – though, to anticipate, I am more confident that the eternal-afterlife possibility is desirable than that the extending-earthly-life-forever possibility is desirable.  
One final preliminary remark: Though my response to Williams will partly overlap with some prior responses to Williams, especially the one offered by J. M. Fischer, my response will also be distinctive in some important ways.​[4]​  For instance, it will be distinctive in that it will discuss the role that one’s part-whole-reality conception plays in fending off boredom, where by ‘one’s part-whole-reality conception’ I mean ‘one’s conception of his or her place (or purpose) in the whole of reality’.


I. The Williams-Ribeiro-Barnes argument (or, for short, the WRB argument) 
	Williams is not the only one to have argued for the claim that eternal life would inevitably grow intolerably boring.  For example, Brian Ribeiro is another philosopher who has argued for this claim, and a vivid, fiction-based argument for this claim is advanced in the final chapter of Julian Barnes’s novel entitled A History of the World in 10.5 Chapters.​[5]​  The narrator in this chapter wakes up one morning and finds himself in ‘heaven’, which operates under the principle of providing people with whatever they want.  Though the narrator is fulfilled in ‘heaven’ for many thousands of years, enjoying a wide variety of both lower and higher pleasures, he eventually tires of it all and forms the desire to ‘die off’ (i.e., to cease to exist).  This, moreover, is not something peculiar to the narrator.  Indeed, everyone who enters ‘heaven’ has this same experience.  That is, each human who enters ‘heaven’ is fulfilled there for a great many years, getting whatever he or she wants, but each human nevertheless eventually tires of ‘heaven’ and, accordingly, forms the desire to ‘die off’.  Thus the conclusion for which Barnes argues – and this is the same conclusion for which Williams and Ribeiro argue – is that it is a non-contingent fact about us (i.e., about human beings) that we cannot endure to live forever.  We are not, so the argument goes, built for eternity: Though we can certainly bear living for a finite amount of time (perhaps even for many, many thousands of years, provided that the external conditions are right), we are unable to tolerate an eternal existence.  
What is it, exactly, that makes us (i.e., humans) unfit for eternal life?  The answer given by Williams, Ribeiro, and Barnes can be put as follows:  
(a)	Unless a human has new types of activities or experiences that are open to him or her, he or she will inevitably fall into a state of intolerable boredom.  Indeed, the repetition of the same old types of activities or experiences over and over again, with no prospect of new activity-types or experience-types on the horizon, will surely result in a human’s becoming intolerably weary of life.  Call this the humans-need-newness thesis.  
(b)	The number of types of activities or experiences that are open to a human is finite, even if it is also mind-bogglingly large.  Or, as the narrator in Barnes’s chapter on ‘heaven’ puts this claim, ‘There aren’t an infinite number of possibilities – that’s one of the points to remember about it all…’ (p. 288).  Call this the finite-possibilities thesis.
(c)	Given that humans need new types of activities or experiences, given that there are only so many types of activities or experiences that are open to a human, and given the truism that a human who is living an eternal life would have an infinite amount of time on his or her hands, it is inevitable that a human who is living an eternal life would reach a point at which he or she has exhausted all of the possibilities that are open to him or her – that is, it is inevitable that he or she would reach a point at which there are no new types of activities or experiences that are open to him or her.  And, once this point is reached, an intolerable sort of boredom will surely follow in due course for this human (or, at any rate, this is so on the assumption that the humans-need-newness thesis is true).   
I will refer to the above argument as the Williams-Ribeiro-Barnes argument (or, for short, the WRB argument).  

II. Considering some of the extant responses to the WRB argument
Fischer rejects the WRB argument by denying the humans-need-newness thesis.  Indeed, on Fischer’s view, humans can stave off boredom even if they do not have new types of activities or experiences open to them.  This is so, Fischer thinks, because there are certain types of activities and experiences that are satisfying even if they are repeated over and over, ad infinitum.  In short, then, Fischer rejects the humans-need-newness thesis by appealing to repeatable or inexhaustible pleasures or goods (i.e., pleasures or goods that never wear out or lose their luster).  Though I agree with Fischer’s general strategy of rejecting the WRB argument by way of denying the humans-need-newness thesis, I think that Fischer’s argument against the humans-need-newness thesis is inadequate as it stands.  I will elaborate on this last point soon, but first I want to consider the move of rejecting the WRB argument by denying the finite-possibilities thesis.  
Timothy Chappell notes that it is rather controversial to accept the existence of repeatable or inexhaustible pleasures or goods, and, with this point in mind, he thinks that those of us who wish to reject the WRB argument might do well to make the move of denying the finite-possibilities thesis, as opposed to making the move of denying the humans-need-newness thesis.​[6]​  And Chappell says the following:
A simple response is just to deny on commonsensical grounds, as indeed I already have, that there is only a finite number of things that can happen to or be done by any individual person.  We could also go a little deeper, and point out that the notions of ‘repetition’ and of ‘things that can happen’ that are in use here are fatally indeterminate.  If I climb the same mountain or hear the same opera twice, is that repetition?  If I climb the same mountain twice by the same route (in the same weather?), or hear the same production of the same opera twice (with exactly the same cast?), is that repetition?  Yes and No are equally good answers to both questions, because whether two time-ordered items count as instances of the same type, so that the latter item is a repetition of the former, depends on how we describe them (p. 39).
Thus Chappell claims that the number of types of activities or experiences that are open to a human can reasonably be thought of as being infinite, as opposed to being finite.
What would Williams, Ribeiro, and Barnes say in response to Chappell’s proposed rejection of the finite-possibilities thesis?  Here we can consider Williams.  In his article on boredom and immortality, he discusses a play about a woman named Elina Makropulos (i.e., EM).  When EM is 42 years-old, she takes an extraordinary elixir that prevents her from aging.  Then, after having lived for 300 years at the biological age of 42, she finds that she is intolerably bored.  This leads her to refuse to take the elixir again, as she would rather die than continue on with her life.  With reference to EM, Williams says: ‘Her trouble was…a boredom connected with the fact that everything that could happen and make sense to one particular human being of 42 had already happened to her’ (p. 90).  Presumably, even as he says this, Williams is well aware that, if EM were to continue to live, then there would be some sense in which there are new types of activities or experiences that are open to her; but presumably Williams would say that the sense in which this is so is not the sense that matters.  An example will help here.  In the play EM falls in love many times, with many different men.  But, after having lived for 300 years at the biological age of 42, and after having fallen in love many times, with many different men, she finds that she has tired of the falling-in-love type of activity or experience.​[7]​  Now suppose that we say to EM: ‘We know that you have fallen in love with smooth, wealthy men from various nations, but note that you have never fallen in love with a smooth, wealthy Australian man.  Indeed, that type of activity or experience is still open to you.’  It seems obvious that Williams would say that we are missing the point: Even if EM’s falling in love with a smooth, wealthy Australian man is a type of activity or experience that EM has never had, this is not really relevant, for EM has previously fallen in love with smooth, wealthy men from various nations and the fact that a smooth, wealthy man is Australian is not a difference that matters (i.e., it is a difference that is too incidental to matter).  Speaking generally, then, the point here is that Williams, Ribeiro, and Barnes would presumably respond to Chappell’s proposed rejection of the finite-possibilities thesis by claiming that, even if there is some sense in which each human has an infinite number of types of activities or experiences that are open to him or her, the fact remains that each human has only a finite number of types of activities or experiences of the right sort (i.e., of the non-incidental sort) that are open to him or her.​[8]​  
Stepping back now, I think that Chappell is right to question Williams, Ribeiro, and Barnes for assuming without argument that the finite-possibilities thesis is true.  After all, this thesis is not obviously true, and so, if one is going to rely on it, one should argue for it.  Still, in view of the above remarks, it seems fair to say that Chappell’s case against the finite-possibilities thesis is not sufficiently convincing as it stands.  In short, it is not clear, given just what Chappell has said so far, why Williams, Ribeiro, and Barnes would be wrong to maintain that each human has only a finite number of types of activities or experiences of the right sort (i.e., of the non-incidental sort) that are open to him or her.  Overall, I am inclined to think that agnosticism toward the finite-possibilities thesis is appropriate, at least for now.  (I say ‘at least for now’ because future arguments for or against the finite-possibilities thesis might clearly tilt the scales in one direction or the other.)  Because I am inclined to think that agnosticism toward the finite-possibilities thesis is (at least for now) appropriate, I will not urge us to reject the WRB argument by denying the finite-possibilities thesis.  Indeed, as I indicated above, I think that we should follow Fischer in rejecting the WRB argument by denying the humans-need-newness thesis.
The linchpin of Fischer’s argument against the humans-need-newness thesis is the notion of repeatable or inexhaustible pleasures or goods (i.e., pleasures or goods that never wear out or lose their luster).  The relevant contrast here is with non-repeatable or self-exhausting pleasures or goods, which are pleasures or goods that one finds satisfying, but only for a finite number of times.  In explaining the notion of a repeatable or inexhaustible pleasure or good, Fischer says:
Here an individual may well find the pleasure highly fulfilling and completely satisfying at the moment and yet wish to have more (i.e., to repeat the pleasure) at some point in the future (not necessarily immediately).  Certain salient sensual pleasures leap immediately to mind: the pleasures of sex, of eating fine meals and drinking fine wines, of listening to beautiful music, of seeing great art, and so forth.  These, or many of them, seem to be – at least for many people – repeatable pleasures (p. 85).
In providing further examples, Fischer notes that, for him, listening to Bach’s Second Partita for the Unaccompanied Violin counts as a repeatable or inexhaustible pleasure or good, as does viewing San Francisco from the Golden Gate Bridge, and as does feeling the fog engulfing him in Golden Gate Park (p. 88).  Moreover, though Fischer readily grants that repeatable or inexhaustible pleasures or goods ‘may become boring or unappealing if distributed too closely (or in an otherwise inappropriate pattern)’, he is convinced that a human being who is living forever can effectively stave off boredom by appropriately distributing repeatable or inexhaustible pleasures or goods, that is, by rotating them and spacing them out in certain ways (p. 86).  
	There are different reactions that one might have to Fischer’s argument.  Ribeiro’s reaction is one of total opposition:  
There’s no earthly activity, experience, or project that you – remaining more or less as you are now – would enjoy, were you allowed to do it forever…Whether you want to meet Jerry Garcia and get buzzed, or – on the other hand – read philosophy books, play chess, and reunite with loved ones – or all of these – your enjoyment of these things will all-too-soon become abject despair at the unbearable insipidity of all of them.  Let your enjoyment hold out for a thousand years – no, for 100,000 years – no, for 1,000,000 years – no, for 1,000,000,000 years – and yet you haven’t used up one instant of your eternal afterlife…That’s a scale of repetition that no earthly enjoyment – however pure or deep or refined or rich or vivid or wondrous – can survive…It is from this perspective that I find John Martin Fischer’s discussion of ‘repeatable pleasures’, construed as a response to this problem, so dreadfully myopic (pp. 51-52).
Whereas Ribeiro holds that there is not one single pleasure or good that is repeatable or inexhaustible in the sense affirmed by Fischer, the narrator in Barnes’s chapter on ‘heaven’ is willing to grant that there are a few pleasures or goods of this sort (e.g., the narrator never tires of a certain breakfast that he eats every morning during his thousands upon thousands of years in ‘heaven’); however, as the narrator sees things, these few pleasures or goods that are repeatable or inexhaustible in the sense affirmed by Fischer are not significant enough, taken on their own, to make eternal life desirable for a human being.​[9]​  
My reaction to Fischer’s argument is far more sympathetic than either the reaction of Ribeiro or the reaction of the narrator in Barnes’s ‘heaven’.  Still, I do think that Fischer’s argument is inadequate as it stands.  To be clear, I agree with Fischer that there are repeatable or inexhaustible pleasures or goods, and I agree with Fischer that repeatable or inexhaustible pleasures or goods play a crucial role in ensuring that eternal life can be desirable for a human.  Notice, though, that Fischer’s argument seems to imply that the staving off of boredom in an eternal life is largely a technical affair.  The guiding idea seems to be that each human just needs to figure out (a) which types of activities or experiences are, for him or her, the ones that can always provide pleasure and (b) how appropriately to rotate and space out tokens of these types of activities or experiences in his or her eternal life.  It stands to reason, though, that more than just this largely technical sort of knowledge is needed in order for a human to stave off boredom in an eternal life.  For that matter, it stands to reason that more than just this largely technical sort of knowledge is needed in order for a human to stave off boredom even in this current, earthly-mortal life.  
To see that this is so, we can consider cases of major depression.  In such cases humans typically become incapable of deriving significant pleasure from anything, including those activities or experiences that they have always found significantly pleasurable in the past.  As Andrew Solomon (a writer who has battled with depression for much of his life) says with respect to major depression, ‘The first thing that goes is happiness.  You cannot gain pleasure from anything.  That’s famously the cardinal symptom of major depression.’​[10]​  Or again, David Clark and Aaron Beck note that ‘anhedonia, or loss of interest or pleasure, has consistently emerged as a defining symptom feature of depression’ (p. 4).  Importantly, it is not as though majorly depressed, anhedonic humans have suddenly forgotten how to rotate and space out tokens of the types of activities or experiences that they have always found pleasurable in the past (i.e., their problem is not one of having suddenly lost this largely technical sort of knowledge).  In fact, as one might expect, majorly depressed, anhedonic humans ordinarily try out activities or experiences that have always brought them pleasure in the past, only to find, disappointingly, that these activities or experiences do not bring them pleasure when they are majorly depressed.  Solomon, for instance, writes of scheduling pleasures into his life during one of his own episodes of major depression, all with the hope of bringing himself out of his anhedonic state (p. 45).  He tried out activities that he had always previously found pleasurable (e.g., going to parties, hanging out with friends, and having sex), and he even tried out many activities that he had never tried out before.  None of this worked.  One implication here is that, if Fischer were majorly depressed and experiencing anhedonia (though, naturally, let us hope that he is not!), and if he were listening to the Bach piece that he loves (or if he were viewing San Francisco from the Golden Gate Bridge, or if he were feeling the fog engulfing him in Golden Gate Park), then he would not be able to derive significant pleasure from this activity or experience.  Indeed, there would be a marked absence of pleasure.  And, crucially, this marked absence of pleasure would not be due to the fact that Fischer would have suddenly forgotten how to distribute his repeatable or inexhaustible pleasures or goods in an appropriate pattern.  Again, when people are majorly depressed and experiencing anhedonia, their problem is not one of having lost this largely technical sort of knowledge.  
What all of this points us toward, then, is the following conclusion: It is not true that a human being can save himself or herself from intolerable boredom (or, more generally, from that whole cluster of phenomena that includes not only chronic boredom or tediousness, but also joylessness or anhedonia, colorlessness, indifference, meaninglessness, and a sense of a lack of purpose or reason to continue on with life) simply by knowing (a) which types of activities or experiences are, for him or her, the ones that can always provide pleasure and (b) how appropriately to rotate and space out tokens of these types of activities or experiences in his or her (earthly-mortal or eternal) life.  Indeed, something more than just this largely technical sort of knowledge is required here.  But what, then, is the something more that is required here?  To this question we can now turn, focusing on it first in relation to our current, earthly-mortal lives and then, after that, in relation to the possibility of an eternal life.  

III. What effectively staves off boredom in our current, earthly-mortal lives and in an eternal life
	As a start here, we can consider a quote from Solomon that mentions three general facets of the human being, each of which is relevant when we are considering commonly clustered phenomena such as depression (which is what the quote is directly about), chronic boredom, and anhedonia:
Therapy and medication are the most accessible treatments for depression, but another system has helped many people to cope with their illness, and that is faith.  Human consciousness may be seen bound by the sides of a triangle: the theological, the psychological, and the biological… [R]eligious belief is one of the primary ways that people accommodate depression.  Religion provides answers to unanswerable questions.  It cannot usually pull people out of depression; indeed, even the most religious people find that their faith thins or vanishes during the depths of depression.  It can, however, defend against the complaint, and it can help people survive depressive episodes.  It gives reasons to live.  Much religion allows us to see suffering as laudable.  It grants us dignity and purpose in our helplessness (pp. 129-130).  
Thus Solomon speaks of the theological, psychological, and biological facets of the human being, and he notes that, although talk therapy (e.g., cognitive therapy or psychoanalysis) and medication aim at treating depression by targeting the psychological and biological facets of the human being, there are many depressed people who are helped by faith, which targets the theological facet of the human being.  
One amendment is in order: We should replace ‘the theological facet of the human being’ with ‘the part-whole-reality facet of the human being’.  When people are depressed (or chronically bored, or anhedonic, etc.), it helps them to have (a) a conception of the whole of reality and of their place (or purpose) in the whole of reality and (b) the genuine belief that (or faith that) they can reach or remain in this place (i.e., in the place that, according to their part-whole-reality conception, they should be in).  The most common way for humans to have (a) and (b) is through religious belief, that is, through belief in something supernatural and transcendent.  But humans can have (a) and (b) without being religious, that is, even if they are committed naturalists.  Further, there is empirical support for the claim that having (a) and (b), whether through religion or not, helps people in overcoming depression, chronic boredom, and other closely related phenomena.​[11]​  Many of the empirical studies in this area are focused on ‘spirituality’, which typically refers to various categories, one of which is ‘existential well-being’.  In the words of Douglas MacDonald and Daniel Holland, ‘existential well-being’ can be defined as ‘meaning and purpose in life and a sense of inner strength to cope with the existential issues of life’ (p. 1114).  Clearly, given this definition, one can have existential well-being through either a religious or a non-religious part-whole-reality conception.  In their own empirical study, which focused specifically on spirituality and boredom, MacDonald and Holland found that existential well-being is ‘the strongest predictor of boredom proneness for both men and women, a finding which is in line with available research revealing an inverse relation between boredom and perceived meaning and purpose in life’ (p. 1118). 
In view of the foregoing, it seems reasonable to accept that, in the span of any given human’s current, earthly-mortal life, he or she can effectively stave off depression, chronic boredom, anhedonia, etc., by (1) relying on Fischer’s idea of appropriately rotating and spacing out tokens of those types of pleasures or goods that are, for him or her, the repeatable or inexhaustible ones and (2) having the above-mentioned three general facets of himself or herself functioning well (i.e., the biological, psychological, and part-whole-reality facets).  I will now elaborate on what I mean when I speak of the well-functioning of these three facets of a human.
With regard to the well-functioning of the biological facet of a human: Ordinarily, in people who are depressed and anhedonic, the neurotransmitter levels in their brains are reduced, and the low feelings, irritability, and lack of energy that depressed and anhedonic people often experience are correlated with (and presumably strongly causally tied to) their reduced neurotransmitter levels.​[12]​  The aim of anti-depressants is to bring neurotransmitter levels back up to where they should be (i.e., to where they would be if normal, healthy biological functioning were in place).  To stave off depression, chronic boredom, anhedonia, and so on, then, it helps if a human has his or her neurotransmitter levels up where they should be.  Of course, this raises the difficult question of how, exactly, a human can ensure that his or her neurotransmitter levels are up where they should be; and, as an answer here, I can only note that certain (perhaps obvious) things help, such as eating well, exercising, avoiding stressful situations (insofar as one reasonably can), taking medication (if need be), and keeping the psychological and part-whole-reality facets of oneself in good, working order.
With regard to the well-functioning of the psychological facet of a human: It is sometimes said that people who are not depressed typically have overly rosy views of themselves and their own future prospects.  And that may well be true.  However, even if it is true, the fact remains that, for depressed people, the opposite sort of error is the one to guard against, as, indeed, depressed people typically have unduly pessimistic views of themselves and their own future prospects.​[13]​  Often the undue pessimism of depressed people is largely grounded in very abstract beliefs about themselves, such as ‘I am unlovable’ or ‘I am incompetent’, when in fact there is no good evidence for these beliefs.  With regard to the person who believes that he or she is unlovable, the truth might be that he or she has had some failed romantic relationships, or that he or she has a couple of less-than-admirable personality traits (as just about all of us do).  But, with these points in mind, is it reasonable for this person to conclude that he or she is unlovable, period?  No, it is not.  Or, with regard to the person who believes that he or she is incompetent, the truth might be that he or she has had some failures in his or her life, perhaps even some serious ones.  But, with these failures in mind, should this person conclude that he or she is incompetent, period?  No, he or she should not.  The trouble with these sorts of distorted, unduly pessimistic beliefs is not only that, taken just by themselves, they can make people feel terrible; the trouble is also that they can have negative down-the-line effects.  For instance, the person who believes himself or herself to be unlovable might (because of this belief) largely withdraw from human contact; but, given that this person wants closeness with others, this large withdrawal from human contact can lead to even more unhappiness for this person.  Or again, the person who believes himself or herself to be incompetent might (because of this belief) refuse to pursue accomplishments (e.g., career-related accomplishments) that he or she very much wants, and in turn even more unhappiness can settle into his or her life.  The goal of cognitive therapy for depression is to correct distorted, unduly pessimistic beliefs of the sort that I have just referenced.  Once these sorts of beliefs are corrected, a more positive self-image can fall into place, which in turn can allow for a more fulfilling life.  In speaking of the well-functioning of the psychological facet of a human, I primarily have in mind functioning that is free of distorted, unduly pessimistic beliefs of the sort that cognitive therapy for depression attempts to correct.​[14]​  
With regard to the well-functioning of the part-whole-reality facet of a human: The most common way to have a part-whole-reality conception – that is to say, a conception of one’s place (or purpose) in the whole of reality – is through religious belief.  But, as I noted above, one can have a part-whole-reality conception even if one is a committed naturalist.  As a way of making clearer what I mean by ‘a part-whole-reality conception’, I will discuss two examples of part-whole-reality conceptions, one provided by Christianity and the other provided by Camus; and, in discussing these two examples, I will refer to three markers of a part-whole-reality conception: the overarching-goal marker, the discusses-subordinate-goods marker, and the helps-cope-with-suffering marker.  
	Let me start with Christianity, which entails that God in the form of the Trinity is the ultimate being, ontologically and otherwise.  Regarding the overarching-goal marker: According to Christianity, the overarching goal of human life is to attain unity with God.  Though the pinnacle here consists in attaining unmediated unity with God in heaven, there are imperfect sorts of unity that can be attained here on earth.  The means to attaining unity with God are provided by, among other things, (a) obeying the Ten Commandments as well as the teachings from Jesus that we should love God with our whole being and that we should love our neighbors as ourselves, (b) trying generally to emulate Jesus (e.g., to emulate his patient, forgiving, and generous nature), so far as possible, (c) engaging in communal and individual prayer and worship, where this includes reading and trying to understand the Bible, and, at least for Catholics, (d) practicing the sacraments and taking the magisterium seriously.  Though these sorts of things are general, Christians also commonly accept that there are personal vocations (e.g., a Christian might believe that he or she is specifically called by God to be a physician, or a parent, or a minister, priest, or nun).  Thus, on Christianity, being rightly placed in relation to God and, more generally, to the whole of reality can be (and commonly is) understood in a way that is highly personal.  Regarding the discusses-subordinate-goods marker: Christianity allows that there are many genuine goods aside from the good of being unified with God (e.g., moral virtue, knowledge, aesthetic experience, and friendship), but all such goods are subordinate to, and somehow organized with reference to, the overarching good of being unified with God.  Regarding the helps-cope-with-suffering marker: Different Christians think of the point of suffering in different ways, but, for all Christians, thoughts on suffering are connected to the death and resurrection of Jesus.  Christians standardly speak of taking up one’s cross or of bearing one’s suffering (with the point being, perhaps, that suffering is simply an inevitable part of life), but Christians also standardly speak of finding redemptive value in all suffering.  Indeed, the final say is never had by suffering, taken alone.  Rather, it is always had by the overcoming of suffering, with this overcoming taking place either here on earth or later, that is, in an eternal afterlife.  That seems to be the heart of the Christian message of the resurrection of Jesus.
	Turn now to Camus, whose part-whole-reality conception centers on the absurd.​[15]​  The absurd is the joining together of two horribly mismatched sides, the human side and the world side.  On the human side of the absurd, there is the strong desire for wholeness, deep and permanent happiness, clarity, and reasons for everything.  Unfortunately, though, the world side of the absurd does not offer anything that can answer this strong human desire.  This is so because the world is, in itself, fragmented, meaningless, reasonless, and so on.  Regarding the overarching-goal marker: In the face of the absurd, one might leap away from it (e.g., into a religion such as Christianity).  But, says Camus, this would be a lie.  Another response to the absurd is to succumb to it by committing suicide.  Yet Camus does not favor this response either.  Indeed, Camus’s favored response to the absurd is to face it fairly and squarely and then to live in defiance of it, where this involves one’s finding some kind of happiness for oneself even in spite of the fact that one knows that one lives in a world that is, in itself, fragmented, meaningless, reasonless, and so on.  Camus gives us different examples of this defiant (and peculiarly happy) sort of living, with perhaps the most helpful examples being Sisyphus and Meursault.​[16]​  Regarding the discusses-subordinate-goods marker: One consequence of honestly facing of the absurd is that one rids oneself of the illusory hope that there is some profound and transcendent point to human life; and, once one rids oneself of this illusory hope, one thereby opens oneself up more fully to the simple pleasures of the here and now.  These simple pleasures are not illusions (i.e., they really are available to humans), and these simple pleasures are clear examples of subordinate goods (i.e., they are goods that are subordinate to the overarching good of facing the absurd fairly and squarely and living in defiance of it).  In The Stranger Meursault experiences many simple pleasures (e.g., those of eating, drinking coffee, smoking, sleeping, swimming, and having sex), and he experiences all of these simple pleasures quite fully.  Regarding the helps-cope-with-suffering marker: Camus says, ‘Sisyphus, the proletarian of the gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched condition: it is what he thinks of during his descent.  The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory.  There is no fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn’.​[17]​  The idea here seems to be that, if you face the absurd fairly and squarely, then, even when you find yourself stuck in terrible circumstances, you can overcome these terrible circumstances by taking pride in your own honest reaction to these terrible circumstances and, more generally, to the absurd.  This in itself is a victory.  Similar remarks about the overcoming of suffering can be made about Meursault, as he overcomes his imprisonment and his being condemned to death through honesty and defiance.   
	Though I have appealed to Christianity and Camus in offering examples of part-whole-reality conceptions, there are other examples that could be provided here.  Speaking generally, religions and existentialist replacements for religion provide us with paradigm cases of part-whole-reality conceptions.  Presumably, though, there can be belief-sets that we would not be prepared to count as being either religions or existentialist replacements for religion, and yet that we should count as being part-whole-reality conceptions.  Certainly, if a human has a belief-set that incorporates the three markers mentioned above (i.e., the overarching-goal marker, the discusses-subordinate-goods marker, and the helps-cope-with-suffering marker), and if this belief-set functions like a religion or like an existentialist replacement for religion in this human’s life, then we should count this belief-set as a part-whole-reality conception.  For example, there may be some Kantian atheists who hold (a) that forming a good will is the overarching goal of human life, (b) that there are subordinate goods, notably, the good of happiness, and (c) that, in the face of suffering, one should think, ‘My suffering is nothing to stew about, for what is paramount is not my happiness, but rather that I make myself worthy of happiness by forming a good will’.  If there are some Kantian atheists who hold these beliefs, and if these beliefs function like a religion or like an existentialist replacement for religion in the lives of these Kantian atheists, then we should allow that these beliefs constitute a part-whole-reality conception.    
	What do I mean by the well-functioning of the part-whole-reality facet of a human?  Here I have in mind a human who has a firmly held part-whole-reality conception and who is able to draw on this conception such that he or she has a clear direction for his or her life (both with regard to its overarching goal and with regard to the pursuit of subordinate goods) and is able to cope fairly effectively with suffering.  Further, and relatedly, I have in mind a human who has faith that he or she can reach or remain in the place that, according to his or her part-whole-reality conception, he or she should be in.  In a Christian, this would amount to one’s having faith that he or she can reach or remain in a state of union with God.  And, in one who accepts Camus’s part-whole-reality conception, this would amount to his or her having faith that he or she can reach or remain in a state where he or she faces the absurd fairly and squarely and lives in defiance of it.  (Note that a human can have a part-whole-reality conception and yet fail to have faith that he or she can reach or remain in the place that, according to his or her part-whole-reality conception, he or she should be in.  For instance, there seem to be some Christians who, because of crippling guilt over their own past actions, do not genuinely believe that they can reach or remain in a state of union with God.  The loss of faith here is not really a loss of faith in the truth of Christianity in general; rather, it is a loss of faith in themselves, that is, in their own ability to reconcile themselves to God.  One might not expect this, since Christianity teaches that God will forgive you for anything, provided that you are truly sorry.  But, all the same, this does seem to happen with some Christians.) 
	Stepping back now, I have asserted that, in order for a human effectively to stave off depression, chronic boredom, anhedonia, etc., in the span of his or her current, earthly-mortal life, it is enough if he or she (1) relies on Fischer’s idea of appropriately rotating and spacing out tokens of those types of pleasures or goods that are, for him or her, the repeatable or inexhaustible ones and (2) has three general facets of himself or herself functioning well, namely, the biological facet, the psychological facet, and the part-whole-reality facet.  I should stress that I have here simply stated a set of sufficient conditions; I have not stated a set of necessary conditions, and in fact I doubt that a human must have all three of the above-mentioned facets of himself or herself functioning well in order for him or her to stave off depression, chronic boredom, anhedonia, etc., in the span of his or her current, earthly-mortal life.  After all, it seems likely that there are some humans who stave off depression, chronic boredom, anhedonia, etc., throughout their earthly-mortal lives, without having any firmly held part-whole-reality conception to draw on (i.e., with just the biological and psychological facets of themselves functioning well); and it also seems likely that there are some humans who, in spite of seriously struggling to function well either biologically or psychologically (or both biologically and psychologically), have nonetheless found a way, through the power of their part-whole-reality conception (e.g., through the power of their religious faith), to stave off depression, chronic boredom, anhedonia, etc., throughout their earthly-mortal lives.  
To be clear, I do think that, if a human is living eternally, then he or she probably will need all three of the above-mentioned facets of himself or herself functioning well, that is, if he or she wants to keep depression, chronic boredom, anhedonia, etc., forever at bay.  I say this because these three facets seem to be interrelated such that, when one facet starts to break down, this can – and, given enough time, probably will – adversely affect the functioning of the other two facets.  With regard to the interrelations between the biological and psychological facets of a human: Consider that, if you think about sex, then this can actually make you feel physically aroused.​[18]​  This simple example shows that our thoughts can affect our physical feelings.  Perhaps, then, we should not be surprised by the claim that negative thoughts about oneself (e.g., ‘I am unlovable’) can make one feel physically low, while positive thoughts about oneself (e.g., ‘I am lovable, even if I am imperfect in various ways’) can make one feel physically better.  Reversing things, we know that our physical feelings can impact our thoughts about ourselves, at least indirectly.  For instance, if one has been feeling physically low for a long time, then this might negatively affect both one’s productivity (e.g., at work) and one’s interpersonal relationships, which in turn can lead to negative thinking about oneself (e.g., ‘I am lazy and unproductive’ and ‘I wouldn’t want to be around me either, because I am usually irritable or sour’).  Naturally, the flip-side of this is that feeling physically good for a long stretch can positively impact one’s productivity and one’s interpersonal relationships, which in turn can lead to more positive thinking about oneself.  With regard to the part-whole-reality facet of a human: If one lacks the belief that one’s life has any clear direction or purpose, then one can begin to feel adrift or at sea, which in turn can lead (a) to one’s thinking negative thoughts about oneself (e.g., ‘My life is pointless and worthless because it consists in days that simply drift into one another, all without any clear direction or purpose’) and (b) to one’s feeling physically low.  By contrast, if one believes that one has a place (or purpose) in the whole of reality, and if one has faith that one can reach or remain in this place that one thinks one should be in, then this is apt to lead (a) to one’s thinking positive thoughts about oneself (e.g., ‘my life has a certain point and worth to it because there is a clear purpose that it can fulfill’) and (b) to one’s experiencing positive physical feelings. 
Let us now directly ask: Can a human be eternally fulfilled and thereby live an eternal life that is desirable, either while living here on earth forever (say, after having taken an amazing elixir that allows for this) or while living an eternal afterlife (e.g., in the Christian heaven)?  Or, instead, is this impossible because (as Williams, Ribeiro, and Barnes think) it is a non-contingent fact about us (i.e., about humans) that we are unfit for eternal life?  My answer, unsurprisingly enough, is that a human can be eternally fulfilled and thereby live an eternal life that is desirable by (1) relying on Fischer’s idea of appropriately rotating and spacing out tokens of those types of pleasures or goods that are, for him or her, the repeatable or inexhaustible ones and (2) having three general facets of himself or herself functioning well, namely, the biological facet, the psychological facet, and the part-whole-reality facet.  I have trouble seeing how this answer could be mistaken.  The main problem with Fischer’s response to Williams was that it ignored the fact that, if one is depressed and anhedonic, then one’s repeatable or inexhaustible pleasures or goods will not in fact bring one any pleasure or satisfaction.  But, now that we have supplemented Fischer’s response in such a way as to eliminate this worry about depression and anhedonia (i.e., by adding the condition concerning the well-functioning of one’s biological, psychological, and part-whole-reality facets), I do not think that there is any reason left to doubt that eternal life could be desirable for a human.   
One objection that could (and, no doubt, immediately would) be pressed against me here concerns my acceptance of pleasures or goods that are repeatable or inexhaustible in the sense affirmed by Fischer.  We saw earlier, for instance, that Ribeiro thinks that there is not one single type of pleasure or good that is repeatable or inexhaustible in the sense affirmed by Fischer.  Indeed, Ribeiro is convinced that, given eternity (and the scale of repetition of pleasures or goods that would come with it), we would find that every single possible type of pleasure or good would, at some point along the way, wear out or lose its luster.  Who, then, is correct: Fischer (who believes that there are repeatable or inexhaustible pleasures or goods) or Ribeiro (who believes that there are no such pleasures or goods)?  
I am convinced that Fischer’s position is the correct one.  Fischer mentions that listening to a certain piece by Bach is an activity or experience that is, for him, a repeatable or inexhaustible pleasure or good.  I could make a similar comment about certain songs that I love (e.g., ‘This Old Guitar’ by John Denver), and I suspect that most people could do the same with respect to certain songs that they love.  Moreover, Fischer says that he cannot imagine ever tiring of the view of San Francisco from the Golden Gate Bridge.  Similarly, there are some views that I cannot imagine ever tiring of (e.g., certain views of the Tetons in Wyoming), and I suspect that most people can think of certain views that they cannot imagine ever tiring of.  Further, most people have hobbies or pursuits that they love and that they do not tire of, even though they have already (in a many-times-over sort of way) run through all (or virtually all) of the types of activities or experiences that these hobbies or pursuits offer.  Here is an example.  There are some older college basketball coaches in the USA (e.g., Mike Krzyzewski at Duke and Jim Boeheim at Syracuse) who have been coaching for many years, and it seems that each of these coaches has already ‘seen it all’ – that is to say, each of them has won the National Championship, has coached incredible players, has witnessed virtually every type of scenario or strategy that might play itself out in the span of any given basketball game, and so on.  The point, in short, is that there are no new (or virtually no new) types of basketball-related pleasures or goods that are open to these older coaches, as they have already run through all of the available types there are (and, indeed, have already done so in a many-times-over sort of way).  Yet these coaches continue to coach and, by all appearances, continue to find coaching highly satisfying.  As one last example of a repeatable or inexhaustible pleasure or good, we might think of close, interpersonal relationships.  It seems fair to say that most of us have friends and family members that we cannot imagine ever tiring of spending time with.  Granted, interpersonal relationships are sources of tremendous pain and difficulty.  But they are also sources of tremendous pleasure and goodness.  And, of that within interpersonal relationships that is pleasurable and good, there is much that is repeatable or inexhaustible in precisely the sense affirmed by Fischer.
Ribeiro will, in all likelihood, not be persuaded by the above remarks.  He will likely protest as follows: ‘But you are not really imagining eternity and the scale of repetition that it would bring with it.  What you are imagining, rather, is just a really long duration of time.  And, though some pleasures or goods could hold out for many, many years (maybe even millions or billions of years), that is nothing in comparison to eternity.’  This (likely) protest from Ribeiro assumes that the types of pleasures or goods that we are particularly fond of have attached to them a certain finite amount of power to please or to be good, and that, for each time we experience a token of one of these types of pleasures or goods, we thereby use up some of this finite amount of power that they have attached to them.  The phrase ‘hold out’, which is one that Ribeiro uses in this context, strongly suggests this way of construing the types of pleasures or goods in question.  But this, I believe, is not the right way to construe these types of pleasures or goods.  Here consider how strange it would be if someone were to view beautiful scenery (e.g., the Tetons in Wyoming) – or to engage in some hobby or pursuit that he or she loves (e.g., coaching basketball), or to hang out with people that he or she loves (e.g., his or her children) – and then to think, ‘That was nice, but it’s too bad that I have just used up some of the finite power to please or to be good that attaches to this type of pleasure or good.’  This thought does not really occur to people when they are experiencing the types of pleasures or goods in question here, and I take it that the reason for this is that there is nothing in our experience of these types of pleasures or goods that suggests that this thought has any legitimacy to it.
Let me stress that all of the above remarks that I have made about the existence of repeatable or inexhaustible pleasures or goods should be understood as having an important proviso tacked onto them, namely, the proviso that we are assuming that the human in question is not depressed or anhedonic, and also that the human in question is appropriately rotating and spacing out tokens of the types of pleasures or goods in question.  Notice, though, that my mentioning of this proviso might lead Williams, Ribeiro, and Barnes to press a different line of objection, one that can be put like this: ‘It is problematic to assume that the human in question is not anhedonic or depressed.  In trying to get this assumption to go through, you have spoken of the well-functioning of three facets of a human.  But is it really reasonable to think that these three facets can function well for an eternity?  You conceded above that, to keep depression and anhedonia at bay forever, one probably would need to have all three of these facets functioning well (i.e., having only one or two of these facets functioning well would not do the job).  However, the chances of one of these facets breaking down, given eternity, are very high, at least if we are talking about an eternal life that is lived here on earth (or, at any rate, somewhere in the natural world).  The natural world is far from being a well-controlled environment: Things go awry all the time, and in fact entropy seems, for the most part, to have the final say.  It is hard to believe, then, that a human who is living forever here on earth (or anywhere in the natural world) could eternally maintain the well-functioning of all three of the above-mentioned facets.  Yet, once one facet breaks down, the other two will follow (because of the interrelations among the facets) and depression and anhedonia will sink in, at which point this eternal life will obviously not be desirable.  One further, related point: All so-called repeatable or inexhaustible pleasures or goods tend to bring with them much that is unpleasant and difficult.  For instance, to get to the Tetons, one would have to travel there, and traveling can be toilsome in many ways.  (Of course, one could live in Wyoming and thereby avoid traveling; but then one would have to deal with brutal winters, among other things.)  Or again, as you noted above, close, interpersonal relationships bring with them much that is pleasant and good, but they also bring with them much that is unpleasant and difficult.  It stands to reason that, in an eternal life lived here in the natural world where these unpleasant and difficult things really cannot be avoided (since, again, this natural world is far from being a well-controlled environment), these unpleasant and difficult things would, given enough time, take a serious toll on the psychological and part-whole-reality facets of a human.  Indeed, these unpleasant and difficult things very likely would, given enough time, lead (a) to one’s thinking many negative thoughts that would undermine one’s psychological well-functioning and (b) to one’s losing faith either in the truth of his or her part-whole-reality conception (e.g., in the truth of Christianity) or in his or her own ability to reach or remain in the place that he or she should be in, according to his or her part-whole-reality conception (e.g., if one accepts Camus’s part-whole-reality conception, then one may well lose one’s faith that one can remain defiant for an eternity, as defiance requires psychic energy, that is, psychic energy that can easily be whittled away at by unpleasant and difficult things).’ 
I can think of various ways to push back against the above line of objection.  But suppose, for the sake of argument, that I concede the above line of objection.  Would this concession matter?  I do not think that it would matter.  Or, at any rate, I do not think that it would matter much.  The above line of objection, if successful, would only count against the desirability of an eternal life that is lived here on earth (or anywhere in the natural world).  This is so because the above line of objection is grounded in thoughts relating specifically to the natural world, that is, in thoughts relating specifically to the entropic tendencies of the natural world and, in line with this, to the unavoidability of experiencing unpleasant and difficult things while living in the natural world.  Frankly, though, it is not all that significant if Williams, Ribeiro, and Barnes are right to claim that humans are (as a matter of non-contingent fact) unfit for an eternal life that is lived here on earth (or anywhere in the natural world).  After all, the vast majority of people who want an eternal life are not really concerned with (i.e., they do not place any serious hope in) the possibility of living an eternal life here on earth (or anywhere in the natural world).  Indeed, what the vast majority of people who want an eternal life are really concerned with (i.e., what they do place serious hope in) is the possibility of living an eternal life in a better place, that is, in an afterlife location (e.g., the Christian heaven) that (a) is far better controlled than the natural world is and, in line with this, (b) allows the humans who are there to have pleasant and good things, while avoiding all (or virtually all) unpleasant and difficult things.  Naturally, it would be very significant if Williams, Ribeiro, and Barnes were right to claim that humans are (as a matter of non-contingent fact) unfit for an eternal life that is lived in an afterlife location (e.g., the Christian heaven).  But Williams, Ribeiro, and Barnes are not right to claim this.  In saying this I am thinking, unsurprisingly enough, that a human being who is living an eternal life in an afterlife location (e.g., the Christian heaven) could be eternally fulfilled by (1) relying on Fischer’s idea of appropriately rotating and spacing out tokens of those types of pleasures or goods that are, for him or her, the repeatable or inexhaustible ones and (2) having the three general facets of himself or herself functioning well (i.e., the biological, psychological, and part-whole-reality facets).  
Of course, once we focus strictly on an eternal life that is lived in an afterlife location (e.g., the Christian heaven), new objections (i.e., ones that focus on problems peculiar to the afterlife location) might be raised.  I will now briefly discuss two of these objections. 
Objection #1: Here the objection is not so much that the prospect of living forever in an afterlife location is undesirable as it is that the prospect of living forever in an afterlife location is unintelligible.  This objection can be put as follows.  ‘We have a fairly clear idea of what an eternal life that is lived here on earth (or somewhere in the natural world) might look like.  After all, we can just think of life as we know it here on earth, and then we can imagine that it does not stop.  However, once we start considering an eternal life that is lived in an eternal afterlife location (e.g., the Christian heaven), things become far more obscure.  For instance, what would time be like in an afterlife?  Or again, would we have physical bodies in an afterlife?  It is hard even to know how to begin to answer questions such as these.’  
In response: Questions such as these are difficult, and we cannot answer them in anything like a fully satisfying way – not, anyway, while we are still here on earth, living our earthly-mortal lives.  But, that being said, there are intelligible answers (or, at any rate, intelligible stipulations that can be made for the sake of inquiry) that are available here.  For example, with regard to time, we can stipulate, for the sake of inquiry, that our experience of time in an eternal afterlife will be pretty much the same as our experience of time here on earth, except that, whereas our experience of time here on earth necessarily involves aging, decay, entropy, and so on, our experience of time in an eternal afterlife will not (or will not necessarily) involve these things.  Or again, with respect to the question of whether we would have physical bodies in an afterlife, we can stipulate, for the sake of inquiry, that the answer is ‘yes’.  (From a specifically Christian viewpoint, this stipulation is appropriate, since Christians accept the resurrection of the body.​[19]​)  In this way, then, this first objection can be effectively dealt with.
Objection #2: Many theists (e.g., many Christians) believe that in heaven humans will be contemplatively lost in God in a way that is eternally pleasant and peaceful.  Williams, however, has objected to any form of contemplation that is eternally absorbing such that it involves one’s being forever lost in the object of contemplation.​[20]​  Williams’s objection here can be put like this: If a human is forever lost in an object of contemplation (e.g., God), then this human, understood as a particular person with a certain stability of character, is really no longer there at all; but surely any eternal life of this sort (i.e., of the sort that fails to preserve one’s identity as a particular person with a certain stability of character) is too impersonal to be desirable.
I believe that this objection from Williams fails.  Think of the matter this way.  If I am reading an interesting book, and if I am fully absorbed in the book, then my consciousness is wholly filled up with the book, in which case I can truly be said to be lost in the book.  But it does not follow from my being lost in the book that I have lost my individual identity, that is, my identity as a particular person with a certain stability of character.  Fischer has already made this same point.  He has said that, in cases where one loses oneself in an object, the content of one’s experience is focused outward rather than on oneself – but, even so, the experience is still one’s own (p. 81).  In saying that the experience is still one’s own, Fischer’s point is that one’s individual identity is preserved (i.e., one remains a particular person with a certain stability of character).  I realize that one might protest by saying: ‘But Williams’s objection is not about being fully absorbed in something ordinary like a book for a couple of hours.  Rather, it is about being fully absorbed in something extraordinary (e.g., God or the Platonic Form of the Good) forever.’  This is true, but it is not at all clear why the length of time and the extraordinariness of the object that one is fully absorbed in make any significant difference here.  In sum, then, losing oneself in an object of contemplation is just a matter of having one’s consciousness filled up with this object of contemplation.  It is not a matter of losing one’s identity as a particular person with a certain stability of character.  And this seems to hold true regardless of the duration of the contemplation, and regardless of what the object of contemplation is.  
For those who are unconvinced by the above response, there is a different way to deal with the objection from Williams that is at issue here: One can sidestep it.  An eternal afterlife, even one lived in the Christian heaven, need not be understood in a forever-lost-in-God-via-contemplation way.  After all, we might understand an eternal afterlife, even one lived in the Christian heaven, as involving a variety of different types of activities or experiences: contemplating God (or, at any rate, sharing time with God in some way), viewing beautiful mountains (or other kinds of scenery), engaging in hobbies or pursuits that one loves (e.g., coaching basketball), spending time with family and friends, etc.  And, naturally, if this is how we are construing an eternal afterlife, then Williams’s objection does not even get off the ground.

IV. Conclusion
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